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felon during the commission of a felony. Whether the doctrine will be
applied in such a situation is problematical in light of the reasoning ex-
pressed in the Butler and Garippo cases.
Little difficulty has been encountered in the several jurisdictions in
situations where the defendant has killed the victim while in the commis-
sion of a felony. It is when this pattern is varied that divergence of
opinion arises as to the applicability of the felony murder rule. It well
may be that the proximate cause approach as expressed in the instant case
best serves the public policy which militates so vehemently against any
action which endangers the life of another man.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ILLINOIS PUBLIC POLICY DOES
NOT PREVENT CHILD FROM SUING PARENT FOR
WILFUL AND WANTON CONDUCT
The wife and a son of defendant were killed and another son was
severely injured as passengers in an automobile driven by defendant. The
administrator of the estate of the deceased wife and minor child brought
suit under the Illinois wrongful death statute charging defendant father
with wilful and wanton conduct. The surviving minor son, through his
next friend, proceeded against the defendant father for personal injuries
alleging wilful and wanton misconduct. Motions to dismiss these actions
were filed and sustained by both the trial and appellate courts. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court reversed the lower court declaring that the contribu-
tory negligence of one beneficiary does not bar an action for wrongful
death by the innocent beneficiaries. It was further held that the public
policy of Illinois does not prevent a minor from suing a parent for injuries
caused by the parents wilful and wanton misconduct. Nudd v. Matsoukas,
7 111. 2d 608,131 N.E. 2d 525(1956).
The impact of the decision in so far as it permits an innocent bene-
ficiary to recover under the Illinois wrongful death act where other bene-
ficiaries were contributorily negligent has been diminished because, in
1955, the legislature amended the act to provide for this result. However,
the recognition of a cause of action in a child for wilful and wanton con-
duct of the parent definitely provides new fuel for litigation in Illinois.
The Illinois amendment to the wrongful death act is as follows:
In any such action to recover damages where the wrongful act, neglect or
default causing the death occurred on or after the effective date of this amend-
atory act of 1955, it shall not be a defense that the death was caused in whole
or in part by the contributory negligence of one or more of the bene-
ficiaries .... Provided, however, that the amount of damages given shall not
include any compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting
from such death, to such contributorily negligent person or persons; and pro-
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vided further, that such contributorily negligent person or persons shall not
share in any amount recovered in such action.1
Previous to the amendment this question had been settled in Illinois by
the decision in Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Bus Co. 2 In that case the
husband of deceased sued as administrator for the wrongful death of his
wife alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant. Plaintiff
husband was found guilty of contributory negligence and notwithstand-
ing the fact that there were five innocent beneficiaries the court held that
the whole action was barred. The Hazel decision was based on the reason-
ing:
The cause of action is entirely statutory and is a single cause of action.
There is no separation of the damages to be assessed by the jury. Their
finding is for a single gross amount in an inseparable cause of action and con-
tributorly negligence of one beneficiary who may be entitled to share in the
amount recovered is a defense to the action.3
Such reasoning has been called "a fictitious theory of indivisibility" by the
court in the instant case.
By reason of the 1955 amendment, and the decision in the instant case,
Illinois has aligned itself with the majority. Indiana also has rejected the
indivisibility theory holding that each of the beneficiaries has an individ-
ual interest in the damages recoverable. Thus, the action of one benefi-
ciary cannot bar the right of recovery of the others.4 If there is at least
one innocent beneficiary, recovery is possible.5 But if the sole beneficiary
is guilty of contributory negligence no recovery is allowed. 6 Some au-
thorities hold that negligence by a beneficiary does not require even a
reduction of damages to the extent of the shares of the negligent bene-
ficiary. 7 Generally then, it can be stated that innocent beneficiaries may
recover under a wrongful death statute although there are negligent
beneficiaries.8 On the point of the minor suing his parent, the modern
trend is to allow action in negligence and especially so where the action
is for wilful and wanton conduct.9 The Illinois court followed the theory
1 M. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap. 70, pars. 1, 2. 2 310 Ill. 38, 141 N.E. 392 (1923).
3 Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Bus Co., 310 Ill. 38, 49, 141 N.E. 302, 396 (1923).
4 Lindley v. Sink, 218 Ind. 1, 30 N.E. 2d 456 (1940).
5 O'Connor v. Benson, 301 Mass. 145, 16 N.E. 2d 636 (1938).
'Purdy v. Kerentoff, 152 Ohio St. 391, 89 N.E. 2d 565 (1949).
7 Danforth v. Emmons, 124 Me. 156, 126 At. 821 (1924); O'Connor v. Benson, 301
Mass. 145, 16 N.E. 2d 636 (1938).
8Nosser v. Nosser, 161 Miss. 636, 137 So. 491 (1931); Cleveland C.C.&St. L.R. Co.
v. Grambo, 103 Ohio St. 471, 134 N.E. 648 (1921); Horne v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail-
road Co., 177 S.C. 461, 181 S.E. 642 (1935); Secrest v. Pacific Electric Railway, 60
Cal. App. 2d 746, 141 P. 2d 747 (1943).
9 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ad. 905 (1930); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260,
212 N.W. 787 (1927).
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set out in Cowgill v. Boock 10 which indicates this trend. The court in that
case said that the rule of non-liability of a parent for a personal injury
sustained by an unemancipated child, though based on the wholesome
policy of preserving the security of the home, is not an absolute rule to be
adhered to regardless of the character of the tort or the factual situation
involved, and should be modified to allow recovery for a wilful and mali-
cious tort. The holding there, as in the instant case, was that where a
parent is guilty of wilful and wanton conduct he is not exercising a paren-
tal function. In Clasen v. Pruhs," it was held that a parent is not liable
for moderately and reasonably correcting a child, but is liable for un-
reasonable correction. 12
In Taubert v. Taubert,3 the court held that a minor cannot sue his
parent for tort unless he has been emancipated. In a later Indiana case,14
the court would not allow a child to recover from a parent, placing its
decision on the criminal laws and the equity powers of the court to pro-
tect the child. The court stated that it was not prepared to rule that in no
such case should a suit not be allowed. In Dix v. Martin,5 the Missouri
court allowed an action to recover damages occasioned by an assault upon
a minor. The court said that a parent can inflict reasonable punishment
for misconduct of the child, but the parent is without right to subject the
child to inhuman treatment.
The court in the instant case considered the question of parental im-
munity from tort action by a child for wilful and wanton conduct a novel
one in Illinois. The rule of parental immunity from tort actions sounding
in negligence was first adopted in Illinois in Foley v. Foley.'6 There the
child was not permitted to sue the negligent parent who did not provide
medical attention. The theory postulated was that the public policy of the
state required the preservation of the family unit. This policy is reiterated
in the instant case wherein it is stated that any justification for the rule of
parental immunity can be only in reluctance to create litigation and strife
between members of a family unit. The court noted that this action was
for wilful and wanton conduct and not for negligence and thus not pre-
vented by public policy.
The Illinois Supreme Court is thus following the modern trend. While
it allows an action between a parent and child for wilful and wanton mis-
10 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950).
1169 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903).
12 See also the dissenting opinion in Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12
(1923).
13 130 Minn. 247 (1908).
14 Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924).
15 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913).
10 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895).
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conduct, it recognizes the doctrine of the parent's immunity from a suit
by an unemancipated minor child, sounding in negligence.
In conclusion, it would seem that the cases run strongly to the effect
that an unemancipated minor cannot maintain an action against his parent
to recover damages for negligence. 17 But there is a strong modern trend
which accords with certain of the older rulings to allow an action by the
unemancipated minor against his parent for negligence in some instance,
and especially to allow the action where the injury is intentional, or
resulted from wilful misconduct or an evil mind.' 8
LANDLORD AND TENANT-EXCULPATORY CLAUSE
RELIEVES LESSEE OF LIABILITY FOR
OWN NEGLIGENCE
The plaintiffs as lessor and the fire insurance subrogee under the lessor's
insurance policy brought an action against the lessee to recover damages
for the loss of the leased building, machinery, and equipment allegedly
caused by lessee's negligence in causing a fire. A jury trial in the Superior
Court of Cook County found that the fire and resulting damage were
caused by the lessee's negligence. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed
the trial court and held that the exculpatory clause in the lease should be
construed to release the lessee from tort liability for negligence. Cerny-
Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., 131 N. E. 2d 100 (7 I1l. 2d 393, 1956).
Three clauses in the lease were relied upon for the determination of the
case:
(2) Lessee will keep said premises ... in good repair ... and upon the ter-
mination of this lease, in any way, will yield up said premises to lessor in good
condition and repair (loss by fire and ordinary wear excepted).
(8) ... And the lessee at his own expense will keep all improvements other-
wise in good repair (injury by fire or other cause beyond lessee's control ex-
cepted)....
(14) Lessor shall pay for fire insurance on the building and equipment and
machinery hereby leased, and lessee agrees to pay for any increase in fire in-
surance premium on such insurance policies due to any increase in the insur-
ance rate due to the nature of lessee's business .... 1
In the first trial, the judge ruled as a matter of law that the lessee was
exonerated from liability for loss due to fire, interpreting clause eight as
an exculpatory clause. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the
17Augustin v. Ortiz, 187 F. 2d 496 (C.A. 1st, 1951); Owens v. Auto. Mut. Indem.
Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 Ad. 498
(1930).
18 Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W. 2d 245 (1939); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino,
248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928).
1 Cerny-Pickas v. C. R. Jahn, 7 111. 2d 393, 394, 131 N.E. 2d 100, 102 (1956).
